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Being observed when completing physical and mental tasks alters how successful people are at 
completing them. This has been explained in terms of evaluation apprehension, drive theory, and 
due to the effects of stress caused by being observed. In three experiments, we explore how being 
observed affects participants' ability to recognise faces as it relates to the aforementioned theories - 
easier face recognition tasks should be completed with more success under observation relative to 
harder tasks. In Experiment 1, we found that being observed during the learning phase of an 
old/new recognition paradigm caused participants to be less accurate at the test phase than not 
being observed. Being observed at test did not affect accuracy. We replicated these findings in an 
line-up type task in Experiment 2. Finally, in Experiment 3, we assessed whether these effects were 
due to the difficulty of the task or due to the physiological stress being observed caused. We found 
that while observation caused physiological stress, it did not relate to accuracy. Moderately difficult 
tasks (upright unfamiliar face recognition and inverted familiar face recognition) were detrimentally 
affected by being observed, whereas easy (upright familiar face recognition) and difficult tasks 
(inverted unfamiliar face recognition) were unaffected by this manipulation. We explain these 
results in terms of the direct effects being observed has on task performance for moderately difficult 
tasks and discuss the implications of these results to cognitive psychological experimentation. 
 





Being observed caused physiological stress leading to poorer face recognition 
Face recognition is an expert skill that plays an essential role in eyewitness testimony (Werner, 
Kühnel, & Markowitsch, 2013). Despite being a form of evidence that is heavily relied-upon in 
criminal investigations, eyewitness testimony is notably unreliable (Valentine & Davis, 2015). 
Eyewitness misidentification has been identified as the cause of 29% of the 2068 overturned 
wrongful convictions documented between 1989 and July 2017 in the US (National Registry of 
Exonerations, 2017). DNA-based exoneration data reveal that eye-witness misidentification was 
responsible for conviction in 70% of cases. Both estimator (factors beyond the criminal justice 
system's control) and system (aspects of the criminal justice system's procedures that affect eye-
witness accuracy) variables are known to influence the reliability of eye-witnesses (Mickes & 
Gronlund, 2017; Wells, 1978). Estimator variables include aspects of the crime (such as the stress 
and arousal it elicits; Aharonian & Bornstein, 2008; Valentine & Mesout, 2008) and of the witness 
(including their ability to cope with stress). System variables include instructions given to witnesses 
during line-up procedures and the behaviour of the police officers during such a procedure (Leach, 
Cutler, & Van Wallendael, 2009; Mickes & Gronlund, 2017; Valentine & Davis, 2015). 
It is common practice for the police to accompany and observe an eye-witness during line-up tasks 
(either looking through photographs or during the video-line-up procedure). Such observation of 
people completing face recognition tasks is common place in further applied settings such as at 
identity checkpoints. The mere presence of an observer can alter both social behaviours and task 
performance, including memory recall (Berger et al., 1981; Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009). This might be 
due to the anxiety caused by being observed or due to the increased apprehension of being 
evaluated during the task. Indeed, during applied eye-witness procedures, witnesses may feel they 
are expected to produce a (correct) identification which may cause evaluation apprehension 
(Henchy & Glass, 1968). Given that human behaviour is situationally dependent and as such, the 
constraints found in highly controlled lab-based experiments risk misinterpreting or overlooking key 
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elements of social-cognitive function (Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood (2008) especially in face 
recognition (Logie, Baddeley, & Woodhead, 1987), it is important to explore how being observed 
affects face recognition. 
Performance can be either enhanced or impaired due to the presence of others. Social facilitation 
(Allport, 1920; Miyazaki, 2013; Zajonc, 1965) is where enhanced performance is observed in the 
presence of others. Online gaming research indicates that crowd observation correlates with an 
increase in player performance (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini & Sherry, 2013). Facilitation extends 
beyond gaming and into non-gaming cognitive abilities such as hand-eye coordination and mental 
rotation. However, this effect was only observed in gamers who were considered better than 
average. Moreover, such outcomes were only present in low-difficulty games: games requiring 
advanced cognitive ability resulted in a significant increase in failure whilst observers were present 
indicating social inhibition (when performance is lower due to observation, Pessin, 1933; Hoyt, 
Blascovich & Smith, 2003). 
Zajonc (1965) attempted to explain these two social effects with Drive Theory: the presence of a 
passive audience leads to greater performance for well-learnt or easy tasks as the individual is 
utilising their rehearsed behaviours. However, the presence of audiences may inhibit task 
performance for novel or complex tasks. Thus, the degree of facilitation depends upon a 
combination of task difficulty and individual skill (Liu, Carmen & Yeung, 2015). Evolutionary benefits 
appear to form the foundation of this theory; poor awareness of how others will respond to our 
behaviour makes it advantageous for individuals to be aroused in the presence of others. Our 
instinctive drive to notice and react with other beings enables greater interaction and social skills. 
Alternatively, Cottrell (1968) proposed that an evaluation apprehension (stress concerned with 
observation and scrutiny of others) may elicit anxiety resulting in performance deterioration. 
Evaluation apprehension is supported by theories concerning the effects of anxiety and stress upon 
performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Stress can present itself in two ways; Eustress and Distress. 
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When an individual experiences eustress, they have increased feelings of motivation and 
excitement, resulting in improved performance (Fevre, Matheny, & Kolt, 2003). Distress is 
experienced when the individual has concern or anxiety about the situation, which is outside of their 
coping abilities. This results in a decrease in performance and can lead to mental and physical 
problems (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). An individual’s ability to cope with stressors may result from 
individual differences (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). For example, in sport, the presence of another 
person is deemed as a stressor that can both enhance and reduce individual performance (Manning 
& Preston, 2003) depending on the level of the stress according to the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908). The Yerkes-Dodson Law indicates that as stress increases, performance increases to 
an optimal level before performance negatively correlates with a further rise in anxiety (Martens, & 
Landers, 1970) 
The principle of the Yerkes Dodson Law can also be applied to research investigating stress and face 
recognition. Yuille, Davies, Gibling, and Marxsen (1994) found that trainee police that were in a 
higher stress condition recalled more post-event details accurately than those in a lower stress 
condition in a 1 and 12 week recall test (see also Lindberg, Jones, Collard & Thomas, 2001; Yuille & 
Cutshall, 1986). Conversely, Valentine and Mesout (2011) found that participants who were more 
stressed (as measured using physiological measures) were less accurate in a post-event line-up than 
those who were less stressed. Li, Weerda, Milde, Wolf, and Thiel (2014) found that acute 
psychological stress affected the recruitment of the medial temporal and frontal areas of the brain 
leading to impaired face recognition memory (see also Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod & McGorty, 
2004, and Avery, Van Der Klok, Heckers, & Blackford, 2016, who found that higher stressed 
individuals find learning faces more difficult than lower stressed individuals). If we accepted the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law then we might resolve the apparent contradictions in the above results by 
suggesting that participants in the Yuille et al. (1994) study were less stressed than those in the Li et 
al (2014) study. Further, we might apply Drive Theory to these results and suggest that participants 
who found the face recognition task easier might find that stress enhanced their performance 
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relative to those who found the task more difficult. Indeed, evidence for this latter point stems from 
Roark, Barrett, Spence, Abdi, & O'Toole (2003) who indicated that stress only affects unfamiliar face 
recognition. Processing unfamiliar faces is more difficult than processing familiar faces (Hancock, 
Bruce & Burton, 2000) and may not be based on the same mechanisms (Megreya & Burton, 2005). 
This would indicate that being observed would enhance face recognition of familiar faces whilst 
being detrimental to the recognition of unfamiliar faces due to the relative difficulties in processing 
these stimuli. 
A further class of face stimuli that are harder to process are inverted faces. The face-inversion effect 
is indexed by selectively poorer recognition of inverted faces relative to upright faces as compared 
to objects (Yin, 1969). It is a highly reliable effect in face recognition (Valentine, 1988) and indicates 
that upright face recognition is based on expert processing mechanisms not afforded to inverted 
faces (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986). This means that the processing of inverted faces is more 
difficult than that of processing upright faces (Valentine, 1988) and, given the preceding arguments, 
might mean that the recognition of inverted faces might be affected differently under observation to 
the recognition of upright faces. 
In this introduction, we have presented evidence to suggest that face recognition performance is 
likely to be modulated by the social situation under which faces are learnt and subsequently 
recognised. Observation may lead to social facilitation for easy and well-learnt tasks (Geen, 1983) or 
may lead to social inhibition for difficult or novel tasks (Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990). This 
may be dependent on the level of evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, 1968) or the level of stress that 
the participant is under (Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Such theorising has important practical 
implications for the criminal justice system, but also for models of face recognition and cognition 
more generally. However, empirical evidence for such assertions need to be provided. The series of 
experiments presented here provide evidence for the effects of observation on face recognition. In 
Experiment 1, we explore how observation affects face recognition depending on when the 
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observation is at learning or at test. In Experiment 2, we replicate the effects of Experiment 1 but 
using a line-up procedure. In Experiment 3, we measure whether the effects of observation are due 
to physiological stress (measured using Galvanic Skin Response and heart rate) or evaluation 
apprehension (measured using a questionnaire). We utilise different stimuli and different methods 
in order to demonstrate the generalisability and replicability of these findings. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we employed an old/new recognition paradigm to explore the effects of being 
observed on face recognition. We devised a scenario where participants believed that they were 
being observed during the learning phase and/or the test phase (or not at all) of the recognition 
experiment. Participants believed they were being observed through careful manipulation of the 
physical environment and instructions given to the participants. In this experiment, we explored the 
recognition of unfamiliar faces, therefore (due to Drive Theory, Zajonc, 1965, and evaluation 
apprehension, Cottrell, 1968), we predict that face recognition will be poorer whilst being observed 
compared to not being observed. 
Method 
Participants 
An opportunity sample of 101 (37 male) Bournemouth University students aged between 18 and 24 
years (mean age=21 years) naïve to the purpose of the study were recruited. Participants self-
reported that they had normal or correct-to-normal vision and participated as partial fulfilment for a 
course requirement. Sample size was determined based on an estimate of effect size (r=.46) for how 






Stimuli comprised 38 videos clips (spatial resolution 960x540, frame rate 25fps) of volunteers (19 
female, mean age 23.2 years) seated in front of a plain white background in frontal view, with a plain 
white sheet wrapped over their shoulders thereby occluding clothing such that only the head and 
neck were visible. All volunteers were White (by self-report), without any distinctive or extraneous 
features (such as beards or jewellery). The volunteers were recorded counting from 1 to 5. The 
videos were edited in order to be the same duration (5s), achieved by selecting from the larger 
database, volunteers who spoke at a similar rate and incorporating a short period of silence at either 
end of the counting. All videos were recorded using a Panasonic HDC-SD5 high definition video 
camera under the same ambient illumination and setting. A still image (165x95mm) of each person 
in a neutral expression with mouth closed was used for the test stimuli. 
The experimental procedure was implemented using E-Prime Professional 2 program (Psychology 
Software Tools Inc., 2010). Stimuli were displayed on a 15’ LCD high resolution colour monitor 
(1280x1024 dpi, refresh rate 50hz). Responses were collected on a standard keyboard. To ensure the 
manipulations were believable, a HP HD 2300 Webcam and microphone was appropriately 
positioned in front of the participant with the webcam power light on (switched on, in device 
settings). A second control computer was positioned facing away from the participant but towards 
the researcher, this acted as the device the webcam would project onto (with a Skype application 
open). 
Design 
A 2x2 design was employed with the factors of observation belief (observed/unobserved) at learning 
and at test. Both stages of observation were manipulated between subjects. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four resulting conditions with the proviso that the conditions had a 
roughly equal number of participants in each. Recognition accuracy was measured using the signal 
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detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) measure of stimulus discriminability, d’. Response times and 
response bias, C, were also recorded. Face stimuli were counterbalanced across participants such 
that each face appeared as a target and as a distractor an approximately equal number of times. 
Procedure 
Participants undertook the same experimental procedure (an old/new recognition experiment with 
three consecutive phases: learning, distractor, and test) with the exception of the instructions 
provided to the participants. If taking part in an “observed” trial, the participant was informed of the 
webcam and that it would be recording their behaviour during the trial in order for the Experimenter 
to establish how people react when viewing faces - participants were not told that their 
performance was being judged by the camera. A vital element to the success of this study was the 
belief of observation. In order to make this manipulation believable to participants, the researcher 
reinforced the realism of the “working” camera by adjusting the zoom, fixing the location and by 
turning it on in front of the participant. The researcher also showed the participant their face on the 
secondary computer screen. 
Participants in the recorded at learning conditions were informed of the recording at the start of the 
experiment. Participants in the recorded at learning only condition were told immediately after 
viewing the learning set of faces that the webcam was no longer recording - the researcher then 
disconnected the webcam to solidify belief of authenticity. Participants in the recorded at test phase 
only condition were informed of the recording before the test phase and not before. 
During the learning phase, participants viewed nineteen 5 second videos of volunteers counting 
from 1 to 5 sequentially, in a random order. Participants were required to count aloud from 1 to 5 at 
the same time as the person in the video. This was to ensure adequate attention was paid to the 
stimulus. Between each face there was an inter-stimulus interval of 5 seconds; during which the 
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participants were presented with the following participant number and a statement requesting to 
press any key to continue. 
Immediately following this, the distractor phase began, consisting of two 5 minute activities, 
irrelevant from the task measured. In the first phase, participants viewed the screen populated with 
multiple (1-15), randomly positioned squares and triangles and were required to indicate using the 
keyboard (S-square, T-triangle) which was the majority shape. In activity two, simple maths 
problems were displayed requiring the participant to indicate whether the answer provided was true 
or false, again by pressing the appropriate key (Z-true, M-false). The order of trials within these tasks 
was randomised. Immediate feedback was provided for both activities, where a green (for correct) 
and red (for incorrect) screen with the words “correct” or “incorrect” in the top left corner of the 
screen was presented; added to this display was also the overall percentage score that the 
participant had achieved in the task. 
Following this, a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test was completed in which all 38 still 
images of faces were presented in a random order. Nineteen were target images (faces displayed as 
videos in the learning phase) and 19 were non-targets (new images). Participants were required to 
indicate whether they had seen the image before or not, using the keypad (S-seen, N-not seen). Test 
images persisted on screen until a response was made. Between each face there was a plain white 
screen for 150ms. 
Finally, participants were thanked for their involvement in the study and were debriefed fully by the 
researcher. Ethical approval was granted by Bournemouth University's Faculty of Science and 
Technology's Research Ethics Committee. 
Results 
Participants responses were converted into the Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966) 
measures of d' (accuracy) and C (response bias) using the MacMillan & Creelman (2005) method. A 
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minimum accepted response time of 800ms was set in order to avoid a bias of hyper-clicking during 
test phase. Analysis revealed four participants who had the majority of their responses below this 
threshold and were removed from the sample. A further four participants were also removed from 
the sample due to a large negative d’ estimate indicating a misunderstanding of the response keys. 
Excluded participants came from all conditions in a random fashion. Removing these participants did 
not alter the pattern of the data (decreasing the mean accuracy of the significant effect by 0.08 and 
0.04 for the observed at learning and not observed at learning conditions respectively). The 
subsequent data is summarised in Figure 1 and subjected to a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA. 
For recognition accuracy, there was a main effect of being observed at learning, F(1,89)=4.88, 
MSE=0.42, p=.030, ηp2=.05. Recognition accuracy was higher when participants did not believe they 
were being observed (M=1.73, SE=0.09) compared to when they believed they were being observed 
(M=1.43, SE=0.10). The main effect of being observed at test was not significant, F(1,89)=0.29, 
MSE=0.42, p=.593, ηp2<.01, nor was the interaction, F(1,89)=0.24, MSE=0.42, p=.626, ηp2<.01. 
 
Figure 1. Mean recognition accuracy (d') when participants believed they were being observed at 
learning and at test. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
12 
 
There were no effects of observation belief on response bias, largest F=2.05, smallest p=.156. Nor 
were there any effects on response time, largest F=1.80, smallest p=.183. 
While this approach allows us to explore the locus of when being observed affects face recognition. 
However, recoding the data may allow us to establish if different amounts of stress (different 
amounts of observation) differentially affect face recognition performance. Exploring Figure 1 
closely, it certainly seems plausible that in the condition where participants were not observed in 
either condition, recognition performance was higher than when participants were  observed in one 
condition and this was higher than when observed in both conditions. This pattern was directly 
tested in a subsequent post-hoc one-way ANOVA with the factor coded as fully observed (M=1.39, 
SE=0.14), partially observed (M=1.56, SE=0.10), and not observed (M=1.80, SE=0.13). This did not 
meet the traditional level of significance, F(2,90)=2.34, MSE=0.42, p=.102, ηp2=.05. 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 highlight that being observed was detrimental to face learning, given 
that the main effect of observation belief at learning was significant whereas the observation belief 
at test was not. Being observed potentially caused our participants to find the task more difficult due 
to the fact that they were under extra pressure caused by the observation. This might have led to 
more stress and/or more evaluation apprehension leading to poorer performance. The pattern of 
our secondary analysis revealed that conditions with more stress did lead to lower performance than 
with less stress, though not significantly. The lack of significance may be related to the fact that the 
effect of observation was primarily on learning and not at test, or that the incremental amount of 
stress caused by being observed at test as well as learning is not linear. Nevertheless, the pattern is 






Using an old/new recognition paradigm, Experiment 1 has demonstrated that participants being 
observed during the learning phase show poorer recognition than participants who were not 
observed during the learning phase. Experiment 2 took this further to investigate the potential 
effects of observer presence on face identification performance in a line-up procedure. This serves 
as a replication of the primary finding of Experiment 1 (that being observed influences recognition) 
whilst also demonstrating whether the effect is generalisable to a more ecologically-valid paradigm. 
In this Experiment, we did not compare the effect of being observed at learning relative to test as we 
have established the effect is one of learning. Further, the effects are greater if both phases are 
observed. Therefore, in future experiments, participants were observed throughout the Experiment. 
In Experiment 2, participants assumed the role of witnesses to a fictitious, non-violent theft, and 
attempted to identify the “culprit” of this "crime" from a mock video line-up sequence. We used 
target-present and target-absent identity parades since both scenarios occur in real-life practice 
(Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). We also asked participants to complete questionnaires measuring 
their self-reported anxiety due to being observed or evaluated. We predict that the presence of an 
observer during the mock identification procedure would produce increased (self-perceived) social 
pressure and lower identification accuracy relative to not being observed.  
Method 
Participants 
An opportunity sample of 147 participants (95 female, aged between 18-80 years of age, M = 26.11, 
SD = 12.77) were recruited. Participants volunteered by responding to adverts placed on social 
media and around University campus and halls of residence. Participants were compensated with £4 
for taking part in this study. Sample size was increased from Experiment 1 because of the change in 
design, and an estimated reduction in effect size to r = .36. Participants were randomly allocated to 
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one of four conditions based on the line-up type (target-present and target-absent) and whether 
they would be observed during the task or not. 
Materials 
The materials used in this research included a crime video, two video line-ups  and battery of 
questionnaires.  The crime video and video line-ups were presented to participants using a Tablet PC 
displayed onto a high-resolution colour LCD monitor (1280x1024 dpi, refresh rate 50hz). 
Crime video 
The crime video created for this study was filmed in an empty seminar room at Bournemouth 
University using a stationary digital video camera. This video depicted a non-violent phone theft. The 
scene began with the “victim” working at a computer, with his bag on the floor next to him and his 
phone to the left of him on the desk. The “victim” ordered the computer document to print, and 
went to collect his work from another room – leaving his possessions behind and unattended. After 
15 seconds, the “culprit” entered the room, picked up the “victim’s” phone and placed it into his 
pocket, and walked out. The “victim” returned to the room 20 seconds later, noticed his phone was 
gone, and began to look for it in his bag as the video ended. The “culprit” was visible in the video for 
a total of 16 seconds.  
The video was subsequently edited using Adobe Premiere Pro CC 2015 (Adobe Systems 
Incorporated) video editing software. The resulting video was 1 minute 28 seconds in length, filmed 
at a rate of 29 frames per second and was 1920 x 1080 pixels in dimension. Additionally, the audio 
was removed, the display was cropped to cut out unnecessary background images, and the video 




Two video line-up (one target-present and one target-absent) sequences were prepared using the 
instructions for the National VIPER Bureau video line-up system used by some of the UK Police 
Forces. Both sequences consisted of nine silent, 15s video clips, each featuring a different individual 
(the target and 8 fillers or 9 fillers depending on line-up type). The nine filler actors featured in the 
video line-up sequences were recruited from a local drama department. All were matched using a 
verbal description to the culprit in accordance with Code D of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
[PACE] Act (1984; Home Office, 2017). 
The 15s line-up clips were recorded in an empty seminar room, with the use of a static digital video 
camera held at 1.5 m distance from the face. The framing ensured that for each actor the very top of 
their shoulders was visible and two inches above the actor's head. They were all filmed at a rate of 
50 frames per second and a size of 1920 x 1080 pixels. All the actors wore plain black t-shirts to 
minimise potentially confounding distinguishing features. The timings of all the clips were highly 
controlled: Each clip began with the actor facing forward and looking directly at the camera for 4s, 
before turning their head to the left, then to the right (at 7s), finally returning to facing front at 10s. 
These clips were subsequently edited using iMovie (Apple Inc.) video editing software. The nine clips 
were arranged in a random order with a number playing before each clip for 3s. In the final video 
line-up, the sequence was repeated twice, consistent with PACE. The final versions of video line-up 
sequences were 6 minutes and 9 seconds long (including instruction screens detailing the format of 
the sequence and that the “culprit” may or may not be present within it, consistent with PACE). 
Questionnaires 
Three standardised questionnaires were chosen to record participants self-perceived measures of 
social pressure: the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS: Liebowitz, 1987); the Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation-II Questionnaire (BFNE-II: Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2007); and the Classroom 
Anxiety Measure (CAM: Richmond, Wrench, & Gorham, 2001) with adapted instructions. These 
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measures are suggested to be both reliable and valid in measuring social anxiety and the effects of 
being judged (e.g., Carleton et al., 2007; Fresco et al., 2001; Richmond et al., 2001). The CAM was 
chosen above other methods as it better reflects how participants will react to being assessed rather 
than a trait anxiety level. The LSAS is a 24-item measure that asks respondents to rate on a scale of 
0-3 (3 being the highest) how much fear or anxiety they feel in certain situations (e.g., working under 
observation). It also asks participants to rate how often they avoid the mentioned situations on a 
scale of 0-3, with higher scores indicating more avoidance. The BFNE-II is a 12-item measure that 
explicitly assesses negative evaluation apprehension, in which participants are asked to record how 
much they agree with each statement (e.g., “I often worry that I will say or do wrong things”) on a 
scale of 1-5, with higher ratings indicating more agreement. Finally, the CAM is a 20-item state 
anxiety measure which can be used to record the anxiety participants feel at the moment it is 
completed. It asks respondents to rate how much they agree with each statement regarding how 
they are feeling (e.g., “I feel uneasy”) on a scale of 1-5. Like the BFNE-II, higher ratings represent 
more agreement with the statement. References to the classroom environment were removed from 
the CAM instructions in order to avoid confusing participants. Given that the responses recorded by 
the CAM are temporary in nature, this questionnaire was administered to participants twice: first 
within the battery of questionnaires completed before viewing the allocated video line-up sequence 
(pre-identification); the second after participants provided their identification decisions (post-
identification).  
Design 
A 2x2 between-subjects design was employed with the variables: observer presence (observer 
watching or observer absent); and line-up type (target present or target absent). The dependent 





After providing informed consent to the research, participants were verbally briefed that they were 
to assume the role of witnesses to a fictitious phone theft. They watched the crime video once on a 
laptop either with the experimenter stood next to them watching them or with the experimenter in 
the corridor outside. This was different to Experiment 1 (in which a camera was used) and was done 
to better represent how people might observe things (rarely do people get told about being 
recorded). They were then asked to sit in a nearby waiting area and complete the battery of 
questionnaires in addition to providing demographic information. Questionnaire order was 
randomised between participants. On completion, participants were called back into the experiment 
room. 
Participants were verbally briefed regarding the nature of the video line-up in accordance with PACE 
(Home Office, 2017). They were told that the sequence included nine silent 15-second video clips of 
different individuals, which would each be identifiable by a number displayed prior to the clip. They 
were also told that the 9-video sequence will be played twice, and that the “culprit” seen in the 
crime briefing video may or may not be present in the sequence shown. Participants were instructed 
to begin playing the sequence by pressing the space bar of the laptop keyboard. Depending on the 
experimental condition participants were allocated to, the researcher either left the room as the 
video line-up sequence began playing (for the observer-absent condition) or remained in the room 
(for the observer-present condition). In instances the researcher was present through the 
identification procedure, they sat next to participants (as police identification officers do in real-life) 
and remained neutral in order to avoid posing a distraction or as a source of bias.  
On completion of the line-up sequence, participants provided their identification by stating the 
number of the face or by stating that the culprit was not present. Participants also provided a 
confidence rating for their identifications on a seven-point Likert scale (with higher ratings indicating 
higher confidence). Additionally, participants were verbally asked to disclose whether they 
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recognised any of the individuals from the video line-up. No participants knew anyone in the videos. 
Finally, participants completed the post-identification CAM. Participants were finally thanked and 
debriefed. Ethical approval was obtained from Bournemouth University's Faculty of Science and 
Technology's Research Ethics Committee. 
Results 
As shown in Table 1, participants were significantly more likely to correctly identify the culprit (or 
identify that a target was not present in target absent line-ups) when they were not being observed 
than when they were being observed, χ2=10.10, p=.001.  Specifically, participants are Ω=3.41 (Odds 
Ratio) times more likely to make an accurate identification when not being observed than when 
being observed. Standardised residuals indicate that correct identifications are significantly less 
likely than expected by chance when being observed. The association between observation and 
accuracy did not depend on line-up type, χ2=0.03, p=.869. There was also no association between 
line-up type and accuracy, χ2=0.22, p=.640. 
Using independent samples t-tests, we compared participants' confidence ratings and measures of 
their assessment anxiety across observation condition. These revealed that participants were 
significantly more confident when being observed (M=5.07, SE=0.15) than when not being observed 
(M=4.59, SE=0.15), t(145)=2.27, p=.025. The post-identification CAM scores indicated higher anxiety 
when not observed (M=49.33, SE=1.97) compared to when observed (M=42.14, SE=1.29), 
t(124.561)=3.06, p=.003. Indeed, change in CAM scores from pre-identification to post-identification 
revealed that participants who were not observed (M=0.40, SE=2.20) showed no change in anxiety 
compared to a reduction in anxiety in those that were observed (M=6.54, SE=1.49), t(145)=2.32, 
p=.022. No other comparisons were significant, largest mean difference=2.07 , largest t(145)=1.19, 
smallest p=.237. 
                                                          






Count (and expected count in parentheses) for correct and incorrect identifications when participants 
were observed or not. 
  Identification Accuracy 
  Correct Incorrect 
Observation Belief Observed 12 (20.6) 62 (53.4) 
Not Observed 29 (20.4) 44 (52.6) 
 
Discussion 
Participants who were observed were significantly less accurate than participants who were not 
observed at a line-up task. This replicates and adds to the generalisability of the results found in 
Experiment 1. Coupled with the lower accuracy, participants who were observed were more 
confident in their decisions. This further highlights the lack of consistency between confidence and 
accuracy (Deffenbacher, 1980). This has potentially serious implications for the criminal justice 
system if witnesses are more confident in their decisions, because they are being observed but their 
accuracy is actually reduced. 
One finding that requires further consideration was that we found participants who were observed 
were more confident than those who were not. While the Experimenter did not give any facial 
signals as to whether the participant gave a correct or incorrect response, the participant may have 
felt they were checking the answers. Given an expectation that people will be corrected if they are 
providing incorrect information, participants may have felt they were correct because they received 
no negative feedback. Indeed, participants who seek consensus (even from unhelpful sources) tend 
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to be more confident in their responses than those who do not (Yaniv, Chosehn-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 
2009). 
In this Experiment, we also assessed participants self-reported response to assessment-related 
anxiety using three questionnaires. None of these indicated that being observed cause them more 
stress than not being observed. Instead, post identification, participants who were observed actually 
reported that they were less stressed than those who were not observed. This indicates a potential 
release from the stress of observation due to giving a response. Indeed, the change in CAM scores 
from pre-identification to post-identification show precisely this: participants who were observed 
showed a reduction in anxiety levels following their identification. It would seem that our observed 
participants used the identification process to release their anxiety even though their decision was 
not as accurate as those who were not observed. At first glance, this result might suggest 
observation alleviates stress in this task. Alternatively, the questionnaires may not accurately pick up 
subtle physiological changes in stress levels, especially when the source of such stress is not obvious: 
Participants may have not realised that the observer was increasing their physiological stress. This 
highlights the dangers of introspection as a basis for performance. 
Thus far, we have been advocating a theory that being observed leads to stress that is detrimental to 
face recognition. The questionnaire results seem to indicate that this thesis may not be entirely 
valid. Alternatively, it is possible that these data indicate a lack of introspection on the part of our 
participants. Experiment 3 explores this issue further. 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 have indicated that being observed during the learning of faces causes 
subsequent detriment to the recognition of them in either an old/new recognition task or a line-up 
task. In Experiment 2, we recorded participants' self-reported levels of anxiety and stress using a 
series of questionnaires. Such questionnaire measurements of stress revolve around the participants 
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self-reporting their feelings about a task. Such reports may be inaccurate due to false memory and 
ignore physical factors that can be measured during the task (Watson, Pennebaker, & Folger, 1987). 
Physiological measures, such as GSR and heart rate do not rely on self-report and may better reflect 
stress. GSR measures the amount of sweat secretion from the sweat glands. This causes changes in 
the skin conductance. Sweat can be caused by stress (Harker, 2013). Similarly, increased heart rate is 
indicative of increased stress (Hjortskov, Rissén, Blangsted, Fallentin, Lundberg, & Søgaard, 2004). 
Both are related to the fight or flight response when confronted with a danger as they prepare the 
body for increased physical activity (Curtis & O'Keefe, 2002). While it makes sense to be able to 
remember the danger (if it were a person, for example), when in more extreme danger, it is more 
sensible to be prepared for a physical response, from an evolutionary perspective. Therefore, one 
can directly link the stress response to face recognition abilities in addition to considering the effect 
of stress on cognition more generally. 
Therefore, in Experiment 3, we measured participants GSR and heart rate as they completed an 
old/new recognition paradigm. In order to further assess the predictions of Drive Theory (Zajonc, 
1965), we included familiar and unfamiliar upright and inverted faces in this task. Given that upright 
familiar face recognition is an easy task, we would expect recognition of these faces to be improved 
due to observation-induced stress. We would expect to see the more difficult tasks to be more 
affected by the observation-induced stress leading to poorer performance.  Similar predictions are 
made by an evaluation-apprehension account (Cotterill, 1963), therefore we include the evaluation 
apprehension questionnaire in this study to assess this prediction: Participants scoring high on the 
evaluation apprehension questionnaire will perform better at the recognition of upright familiar 
faces and worse on inverted unfamiliar faces. Finally, we have assumed that the link between 
observation and face recognition is through stress. Given this assumption, we might also expect to 
see a Yerkes-Dodson pattern in face recognition due to the stress levels measured by GSR and heart 
rate - i.e., for participants who are less stressed, face recognition generally is less accurate than 
when participants are optimally stressed. Participants who are very stressed will show poor 
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recognition. We are therefore able to assess three explanations for why observation causes 
participants to be less accurate at face recognition than those not observed. 
Method 
Participants 
A volunteer sample of 80 (51 female, aged between 18 and 57 years, mean age=27.21 years, 
SD=9.85) participants took part in this study. Sample size was planned to match that of Experiment 
1. Participants responded to adverts placed on social media or participant recruitment websites.  
Materials 
Two sets of 80 faces were obtained for this study. One set of faces were of familiar people. Two 
images of UK celebrities were collected from the internet by a research assistant. These were either 
of singers, actors, TV personalities, and sportsmen and women. These images depicted people in 
frontal poses in neutral or smiling poses with no jewelry, hats, or other face coverings. The 
background of the images was masked. These images were presented to 24 undergraduate students 
from Bournemouth University who did not take part in the current study and were assessed for their 
familiarity on a seven-point Likert scale and asked to name the face. Only celebrities that were rated 
above 6 on this scale and were reliably named (or some piece of distinctive biographical information 
given) by 95% of participants were used in the current study. This led to a final sample of 80 famous 
faces. These faces were also rated for attractiveness and distinctiveness on seven-point Likert scales 
by the same participants. 
These were matched for number of males, age, attractiveness, and distinctiveness to a set of 80 
faces (two versions of each) collected from the Minear and Park (2004) database. These faces were 
also presented in frontal view, in either a smiling or neutral pose with no jewelry or other distinctive 
features. Both sets of images were constrained to the size 367 by 425 px in size and presented in 200 
dpi resolution. The images were masked such that only the face was visible on a white background 
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(no clothes were visible for either set of images). An inverted set of images was created by rotating 
the faces by 180o in Microsoft Office Picture Manager.  
The experiment was implemented using OpenSesame (version 3.2.4, 2018) presented on a high-
resolution colour LCD monitor (1280x1024 dpi, refresh rate 50hz). Participants responded using a 
standard computer keyboard. 
The Evaluation Apprehension Scale (Richmond et al., 2001) was used in this study to measure 
anxiety. This questionnaire consisted of twenty-two stress-related questions. The participants 
answered each question on a five-point Likert-type scale, on how much they agreed with the given 
statement (1 being strongly disagree, 5 being strongly agree). Higher scores indicate more evaluation 
apprehension. This questionnaire was chosen as it better reflects the construct that we hypothesise 
explains the effect of observation on face recognition performance than the CAM. 
A Nexus4 Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) monitor was used to measure each participants’ emotional 
arousal (GSR). A Polar-watch (POLAR M400) was used to measure participants average heart rate. 
The participant's heart rate is recorded by the sensor strap and the results fed back to the Polar-
watch for the experimenter to see. 
Design 
A 2x2x2 mixed-subjects design was employed with the between-subjects factor as observation belief 
(observed or not observed) and the within-subjects factors as face familiarity (famous or unfamiliar) 
and face orientation (upright or inverted). Physiological stress was used as a covariate. Face 
recognition accuracy was measured using the Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966) 






After providing informed consent, participants completed seven consecutive phases: set-up, and 
then two cycles of a learning, distractor, and test phase (one was for famous faces and one was for 
unfamiliar faces and this was counterbalanced across participants). In the set-up phase, the GSR 
monitor was attached to the participant's left index finger. The Polar-watch was attached to each 
participant with the sensor strap  placed around the participant's chest, just underneath the chest 
muscles. Baseline physiological measures were recorded for one minute. Subsequently, participants 
were told that they were either being recorded via the built-in camera on the monitor (observed 
condition), or recording was not mentioned at all (not observed condition) in the same way as 
Experiment 1. Apart from the varied instructions of recording given, all participants followed the 
same procedure during the experiment. Following the set-up, participants completed the first 
learning phase. 
In the learning phase of the Experiment, participants were informed they were undertaking a face 
recognition experiment and that they would later be asked to recognise the faces they were being 
presented with. Participants were presented with 40 (20 inverted) faces sequentially in a random 
order in the centre of the screen. Participants rated each face for distinctiveness by responding to 
the question "how easy would this face be to spot in a crowd" on a nine-point Likert-type scale with 
the anchor points "easy" (distinctive face) and "difficult" (typical face). This was done to ensure 
attention was paid to the faces (Light, Hollander, & Kayra-Stuart, 1979). Faces were on screen for 2s 
each. Between each face there was a random-noise mask presented centrally for 250ms. 
Following the learning phase, participants either completed the Evaluation Apprehension Scale or a 
series of demographic questions on the computer. This lasted 60s. Following this, participants 
completed the recognition test in a similar manner to Experiment 1. All 40 target (20 inverted) and 
40 distractor (20 inverted) faces were presented centrally sequentially in a random order. Using "m" 
for seen before and "z" for not seen before, participants indicated whether the faces was a target or 
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a distractor. Faces were on screen until the participant responded to it. Between each face was a 
random-noise mask lasting for 250ms. 
The sequence of learning, distractor, and test was repeated for the other class of face. On 
completion, participants were thanked and debriefed. The experiment lasted a total of 20 minutes 
for each participant to complete. Ethical approval was obtained from Bournemouth University's 
Faculty of Science and Technology's Research Ethics Committee. 
Results 
Participant responses were treated in the same way as in Experiment 1 and summary data is shown 
in Figure 2. The recognition accuracy data were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-subjects ANOVA. This 
revealed that familiar faces (M=1.52, SE=0.05) were recognised more accurately than unfamiliar 
faces (M=1.05, SE=0.07), F(1,78)=39.97, MSE=0.58, p<.001, ηp2=.28. Upright faces (M=1.45, SE=0.06) 
were recognised more accurately than inverted faces (M=1.13, SE=0.06), F(1,78)=26.19, MSE=0.32, 
p<.001, ηp2=.25. These factors did not interact, F(1,78)=0.64, MSE=0.32, p=.427, ηp2=.01. Observed 
participants (M=1.15,SE=0.07) were less accurate than participants who were not observed 
(M=1.42,SE=0.07), F(1,78)=8.20, MSE=0.69, p=.005, ηp2=.10. 
Critically, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1,78)=6.98, MSE=0.52, p=.010, ηp2=.08. A series 
of t-tests comparing the effect of observation for each condition were run. This was significant for 
upright unfamiliar faces, t(78)=2.70, p=.008 and for familiar inverted faces, t(78)=2.45, p=.016 but 





Figure 2. Mean recognition accuracy of familiar and unfamiliar upright and inverted faces for 
participants who believed they were being observed or not. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. 
 
Our next analysis focused on the measures of stress. We did not find that self-reported evaluation 
apprehension differed depending on whether participants were observed (M=2.82, SE=0.10) or not 
(M=2.82, SE=0.10), t(78)=0.05, p=.959. As predicted, average corrected for baseline GSR and heart 
rate were higher when observed (M=7.65, SE=0.05,for GSR, and M=82, SE=1.56, for heart rate) than 
when not observed (M=7.45, SE=0.06,for GSR, and M=78, SE=1.44, for heart rate), t(78)=2.49, 
p=.008, one-tailed, for GSR, and t(78)=1.93, p=.029, one-tailed, for heart rate. We, therefore, 
assessed whether the observed effects on recognition accuracy due to observation were mediated 
by physiological stress by running a series of between-subjects ANCOVAs on each type of face with 
heart rate and GSR recorded at learning and at test entered as separate covariates. Table 2 reports 
any changes to significance to the accuracy results presented above. There were no changes to the 
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pattern of significance when including these as covariates: Significant effects remained significant 
and non-significant effects remained non-significant. 
A parallel analysis on response bias revealed that there were no effects nor interactions involving 
the observation factor, largest F=2.94, smallest p=.090. Nevertheless, participants were more likely 
to respond with an "old" response to familiar faces (M=-.02, SE=.03) than unfamiliar faces (M=.32, 
SE=.04), F(1,78)=66.60, MSE=0.14, p<.001, ηp2=.46. Participants were more likely to respond with a 
"new" response to inverted faces (M=.20, SE=.03) than upright faces (M=.10, SE=.03), F(1,78)=7.03, 
MSE=0.10, p=.010, ηp2=.08. 
 
Table 2. 
Significance level changes for the effect of observation on face recognition accuracy with GSR and 
heart rate at learning and at test as a covariate. 
   Significance with Covariate 
   GSR Heart Rate 





At learning At test At learning At test 
Familiar 
Faces 
Upright p=.470 p=.563 p=.595 p=.576 p=.564 
Inverted p=.016 p=.021 p=.016 p=.042 p=.042 
Unfamiliar 
Faces 
Upright p=.008 p=.011 p=.035 p=.009 p=.014 
Inverted p=.964 p=.999 p=.972 p=.993 p=.972 
 
The parallel analysis on learning response times (to make distinctiveness judgements) revealed no 
effects nor interactions involving the observation factor, largest F=1.22, smallest p=.272. However, 
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unfamiliar (M=1503, SE=122) and upright faces (M=1521, SE=126) were rated faster than familiar 
(M=1913, SE=167) and inverted faces (M=1895, SE=159), F(1,78)=21.26, MSE=631579, p<.001, 
ηp2=.21, and F(1,78)=31.81, MSE=352145, p<.001, ηp2=.29, respectively. During recognition, 
unfamiliar faces (M=996, SE=67) were responded to faster than familiar faces (M=1275, SE=92), 
F(1,78)=26.58, MSE=233552, p<.001, ηp2=.25. No other effects were significant, largest F=1.77, 
smallest p=.188.  
Discussion 
In this study, we attempted to establish whether the effect of observation on unfamiliar face 
recognition was different to familiar face recognition. We hypothesised that because familiar face 
recognition is an easier task than unfamiliar face recognition, it is less likely to be affected by stress 
according to the Yerkes-Dodson Law. Based on the same law, recognition of inverted unfamiliar 
faces will be less affected by stress. This is what we found in the present study. Indeed, the two 
conditions that had similar performance levels - inverted familiar and upright unfamiliar faces - were 
equally affected by the observation manipulation. This would suggest that these tasks are 
sufficiently difficult to be affected by stress but not too difficult. 
While this explanation seems to fit the data well, and we observed physiological effects (increased 
GSR and heart rate) due to being observed, there was no relation between physiological response 
and face recognition performance. In other words, while observation caused an increase in 
physiological stress this did not relate to the detriments observed in face recognition. We also did 
not observe any effects of being observed on self-reported evaluation apprehension. These results 
suggest one of two possible alternatives: the physiological measures were not sensitive enough to 
detect differential stress effects in what is a fairly simple face recognition task; or that the effect 
observation has on face recognition is not through physiological stress. Nevertheless, we found that 
face recognition was affected by being observed and that easy and very difficult tasks were less 
affected by being observed than those that were moderately difficult. This pattern is not the result 
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of floor or ceiling effects and all data were significantly different to chance and ceiling performance. 
Rather this difference reflects a real psychological effect. 
General Discussion 
In the current set of experiments, we investigated whether being observed would affect face 
recognition performance based on the notion that being observed caused changes in several areas 
of cognition and behaviour (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini, & Sherry, 2013; Berger et al., 1981; 
Hameroff, Nip, Porter, Tuszynski, 2002; Hoyt et al., 2003; Laidlaw Foulsham, Kuhn, & Kignstone, 
2011). Across three studies, employing different procedures to enhance the generalisability of these 
findings, we found that being observed during the initial encoding of faces causes them to be less 
well recognised subsequently. This effect replicated into a line-up task. This effect was observed 
when completing moderately difficult face recognition tasks (such as the recognition of upright 
unfamiliar faces and inverted familiar faces) but not during easier tasks (recognition of familiar faces) 
or difficult tasks (recognition of inverted unfamiliar faces). 
We found that the effects of observation affected accuracy but not response bias nor response time. 
This suggests that the effect of observation is directly affecting the recognition response but not the 
threshold applied. Indeed, similar results have been observed by Avery et al (2016). Active ratings of 
faces and recall from memory may incur a set delay and any effect of observation is negligible on 
processing speed. 
The effect we observed here further reinforces the role of social inhibition upon task performance 
(Allport, 1920) and appear consistent with the Evaluation Apprehension Model of social inhibition 
(Cottrell, 1968) and Drive Theory (Zajonc, 1965). Participants were less likely to encode faces as well 
when being observed, which suggests individuals were experiencing high anxiety at the initial stage 
of the experiment. This induced anxiety may have somewhat influenced individuals’ ability to learn 
faces. Learning upright unfamiliar faces is a sufficiently difficult task to be affected by social 
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inhibition. However, learning familiar faces is not a difficult enough task to be affected in this way. 
One result that was not consistent with Drive Theory is that the most difficult stimuli to process 
were not affected by observation. While there were no floor effects, we interpret this as the task 
was too difficult to be further affected by observation. Alternatively, this is due to something more 
unique to the processing of faces - upright faces are processed in an expert manner, whereas 
inverted faces are not (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2009). The familiar face recognition manipulation we 
employed seems to rule out this later explanation, however. 
An alternative suggestion for the present data stems from Gobel, Kim, and Richardson (2015) who 
reported that participants physically altered how they viewed faces once told that they would meet 
the actors on screen. Potentially, the fear of scrutiny caused participants to adjust gaze, resulting in 
poorer overall face learning. When eye movements are restricted whilst viewing faces (Henderson, 
Williams, & Falk, 2005) or are cued to unusual locations of images (Hills, Cooper, & Pake, 2013), face 
recognition performance is lower than unrestricted viewing. Therefore, it seems plausible that the 
stress caused by being observed might be altering the encoding of the faces and this is damaging to 
face recognition. 
While we have presented an argument based on anxiety induced through observation causing stress 
that affects face recognition, our data do not rule out other explanations. Indeed, if the link from 
observation to accuracy was mediated by stress, we would have assumed that the there would be 
no significant effect of observation when physiological stress was included as a covariate 
(Experiment 3). We observed a very small reduction in significance levels, but not a removal 
suggesting only a partial mediation at best. It is possible that the effect of being observed causes an 
added distraction to participants during the task. Paying inadequate attention when learning stimuli 
due to higher perceptual load caused by distraction impairs subsequent recognition for geometric 
shapes (e.g., Rock, Schauer, & Halper, 1976), line drawings (Goldstein & Fink, 1981; Rock & Gutman, 
1981), and words (e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990). Indeed, Baron (1986) highlighted that the 
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attentional system can be overloaded due to distraction caused by the mere presence of other 
people. The mere presence of an Experimenter impairs attentional maintenance in working memory 
(Belletier & Camos, 2018), the identification of central cues (Wühr & Huestegge, 2010), and reading 
span tasks (Belletier, Davranche, Tellier, Dumas, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & Huguet, 2015). Belletier et al. 
(2015) hypothesise that the presence of an experimenter causes participants to attend to them, 
limiting their attentional resources. This might cause attentional (response) conflict, leading to poor 
performance on difficult or attention-demanding tasks (Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004; Huguet, 
Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999; Muller & Butera, 2007; Normand, Bouquet, & Croizet, 2014; 
Sharma, Booth, Brown, & Huguet, 2010). 
The notion that the mere presence of others might cause an increase in attentional demands, 
evidence suggests that face recognition performance remains relatively stable under increasing 
working memory loads (caused by distractor items, Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Stevenage, Neil, 
Barlow, Dyson, Eaton-Brown, & Parsons, 2013). However, face recognition can be impaired when 
another task has to be performed  or attention is disrupted (Kellogg, 1980; Kellogg, Cocklin, & 
Bourne, 1982; Reinitz, Morrissey, & Demb, 1994), consistent with load theory (Lavie, 1995, 2001). It 
could, therefore, be that the mere fact of being observed changes the context of the Experiment to 
be a multi-task Experiment, thereby causing a distraction. Limited attentional capacity at learning 
reduces the number of faces that can later be recognised (Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2005), consistent 
with this theory. To explain the pattern of results observed in Experiment 3 (whereby familiar faces 
were not affected by this multi-task context), we can turn to Event-Related Potential (ERP) evidence 
of Neumann, Mohamed, and Schweinberger (2011). They reported that the recognition of unfamiliar 
faces was impaired by higher perceptual load, however, familiar faces still produced the N250r ERP, 
which reflects repetition and familiarity. This suggested that familiar faces could still be processed 
under higher load. This theoretical position is compatible with Drive Theory (i.e., observation may 
cause evaluation apprehension and this causes attentional capacity limitations), but offers another 
level of interpretation. 
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The preceding commentary is consistent with the notion that stress impacts on brain functioning 
related to working memory and attention. Stress reduces the recruitment of the brain areas 
responsible for working memory and attention (the frontal and medial temporal regions; Li et al., 
2014), which impacts on the ability to recognise faces. The reason why this effect is primarily on 
upright unfamiliar faces might relate to findings of Civile, McLaren, and McLaren (2018) who have 
demonstrated anodal transcranial direct current stimulation to a frontal site (Fp3) reduces the 
recognition of upright faces. Potentially, stress and anodal stimulation are having similar effects on 
the frontal regions, thereby reducing upright face recognition. 
In the current study, we used two methods to observe participants: through a webcam and by direct 
observation by close proximity. Both caused comparable effects suggesting that the way the 
participant appraised the observation was having an effect on their performance. There are known 
individual difference and personality variables that might affect how participants appraise such 
observation (Avery et al., 2016). Future studies could explore these to establish if the effect of 
observation on face recognition is a general one or if some participants are more susceptible or not. 
Furthermore, while the observation of the participants was direct and obvious and in relatively close 
proximity, we cannot determine the limits of this observation effect. In gaming research the distance 
from the player to the observer does have an effect (Hoyt et al., 2003). Here, the observer stated 
that they were observing the participant or not in addition to observing from a close distance or 
moving into another room. Therefore, it will be important for future research in cognitive 
psychology to explore whether passive or direct observation has differential effects on task 
performance. 
This leads to a critical implication of the present work on future studies in face recognition, 
perception, and cognitive psychology more generally. In many studies, the participants are observed 
as they complete the task. Potentially, this has modifying effects on task performance. Such effects 
may be subtle and there may be individual differences in who is affected and to what degree. 
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Nevertheless, failures to replicate and inconsistent findings in previous literature across 
psychological research might be, in part, affected by the presence or absence of the experimenter.  
There are potential practical implications of the current work, especially for those involved in 
learning faces or trying to detect faces in the criminal justice system. Anyone learning faces is best 
advised not to do it whilst under observation or social pressure. Of course, the present studies were 
laboratory based and while we attempted (in Experiment 2) to match the behaviour of the 
experimenter to current police practice, there were no negative consequences for the participant as 
there might be in real eye-witness situations. This may further alter the effect of being observed on 
face recognition performance. 
In conclusion, we have found that face recognition is negatively affected by being observed. This is 
especially evident during the learning of upright unfamiliar faces (or inverted familiar faces). We 
hypothesise that this is due to social observation causing participants to be somewhat anxious and 
due to the Yerkes-Dodson law, performing poorly in a relatively difficult task. However, we did not 
find that physiological stress mediated the relationship between observation and face recognition. 
Therefore, we assume that observation has direct affects on how people encode faces and this has a 
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